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The European Commission has put forward a new proposal for a 
directive on insurance mediation which should provide for significant 
changes in practices of selling insurance products and guarantee 
enhanced level of consumer protection. This proposal accompanies 
other regulatory initiatives in the insurance sector, all of them pursuing 
three main objectives: firstly, a strengthened insurance supervision with 
convergent supervisory standards at EU level; secondly, a better risk 
management of insurance companies; and thirdly a greater protection 
of policyholders. All these initiatives contribute to the EU programme 
on consumer protection and herald a new approach to EU insurance 
regulation and supervision. However, while the new supervisory rules 
are a direct response to the financial crisis and shortcomings of cross-
border cooperation between national supervisors, the plans for the 
revision of insurance mediation rules were conceived much earlier 
due to scandals with mis-selling of insurance products in the United 
States and some EU Member States. This article will focus entirely on 
the Commission’s initiative in the consumer mediation area and the 
aspects of insurance supervision and risk management will be dealt 
with in separate articles.
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Introduction
At the beginning of July, the European Commission presented 
its long-anticipated legislative proposal for a Directive on 
insurance mediation1. With the objective of having equal levels 
of protection for consumers purchasing insurance products 
across the EU, the Commission is proposing to tighten 
disclosure and conduct of business requirements for sales of 
insurance contracts. In addition, by covering direct-selling and 
certain insurance-related activities (e.g. loss adjustment), the 
new proposal significantly expands the scope of the current 
insurance mediation regime, and subsequently also the 
number of protected policyholders. Finally, the Commission 
wishes to enhance consumer protection in relation to a 
distinct category of insurance products called insurance 
investment products. It hereby draws upon the rules of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) regarding 
the identification, prevention and management of conflicts 
of interest. Consequently, two different insurance regimes will 
be now clearly delineated at EU level: one for so-called ‘classic’ 
insurance products without an investment element, and 
another one for products entailing investment factor. 
In the European Parliament, the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee is now discussing the Commission’s 
proposal. Werner Langen, from the Christian Democratic 
Union in Germany, was appointed the rapporteur responsible 
for tabling amendments and preparing the Committee’s 
report. Once accepted by the Parliament in its first reading 
scheduled for May 2013, and if jointly adopted with the 
Council of the EU, the new Directive will 
come into force by the end of 2013 and 
repeal the current Insurance Mediation 
Directive (IMD1) from 2002. The Member 
States will dispose of a two-year time 
period to implement it into their national 
laws. While the legislative adjustments 
might be minor in some Member States 
where reviews of insurance mediation 
rules were undertaken in recent years 
(e.g. the Retail Distribution Review in 
the UK), this new EU Directive will bring 
about significant legislative changes 
in other Member States where many 
aspects of insurance mediation are still 
not regulated. 
The objective of this article is to present the new legal set-
up for insurance mediation and to analyse its impact on 
consumers and the insurance industry.
10 years of insurance mediation regulations: 
minimum standards of consumer protection at EU level
During the last decade, insurance intermediaries’ activities 
were regulated by the Directive on Insurance Mediation from 
2002 (IMD1)2. The objectives of this Directive were two-fold: 
to establish a single market for insurance mediation and 
to introduce minimum standards on consumer protection 
throughout the EU.
Professional and information requirements under IMD1
In order to achieve these goals, IMD1 introduced minimum 
requirements on registration of insurance intermediaries, their 
professional conduct as well as pre-contractual information 
provided for their customers. The fulfilment of professional 
requirements was indispensable for an intermediary to be 
registered by a competent authority of his home Member 
State and it guaranteed a certain level of professionalism vis-à-
vis his customers. Hence, an insurance purchaser could expect 
that his intermediary possessed the appropriate knowledge 
and ability to provide intermediation services (Article 4 (1)), 
was of good repute, had a clean police record and had not 
previously been declared bankrupt (Article 4 (2)). In addition, 
intermediaries were required to hold professional indemnity 
insurance against liability arising from professional negligence 
(Article 4 (3)). 
The requirements for pre-contractual information determined 
the process of selling insurance products by insurance 
intermediaries. Prior to the conclusion of any initial insurance 
contract, an insurance intermediary had to inform about his 
status, commercial links or contractual obligations towards an 
insurance undertaking and the nature of advice given (Article 
12 (1)). All intermediaries were required to specify customers’ 
demands and needs, and underlying reasons for advice 
given on a given insurance product before the conclusion of 
a contract. In addition, independent intermediaries (without 
commercial links or contractual obligations towards insurance 
undertakings) were required to give advice on the basis of 
analysing a sufficiently large number of insurance contracts 
available on the market (Article 12 (2, 3)). 
With merely three articles laying down the above-mentioned 
professional and pre-contractual information requirements, 
the old Directive required only the minimum obvious for any 
professional conduct and thus provided a fairly basic level of 
consumer protection. Moreover, its provisions were written in 
a very general manner, thus allowing for a wide interpretation 
by the Member States. Lastly, the Directive was a minimum 
harmonisation legal act, allowing for reinforcement of its 
minimum standards by the Member States. 
Problems with IMD1 implementation
The minimum harmonisation approach was characteristic for 
the first generation of EU insurance mediation regulation but 
‘gold-plating’ practices used by the Member States has clearly 
thwarted the EU legislator’s attempt to guarantee a similar 
level of consumer protection within the EU.
In 2008, the Commission carried out an ‘implementation 
check’, revealing substantial differences in national approaches 
to IMD1 implementation, and subsequently a regulatory 
patchwork of national insurance mediation regulations3.   
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In countries like the UK, France or the 
Netherlands, the minimum standards were 
exceeded by additional stricter rules. This 
‘gold-plating’ brought about significant 
inconsistencies in applying IMD1 across 
the EU. Consequently, the IMD1 objective 
– the introduction of a similar level of 
consumer protection across the EU – was 
not achieved.
Conflict of interest and conduct of business rules: 
IMD1 vs. MiFID
There has been a great deal of negative publicity surrounding 
insurance industry in the years preceding the financial crisis. In 
particular, the controversy of brokers’ contingent commissions 
has cast light on intransparent practices of insurance 
companies and intermediaries which proved to be in conflict 
of interest with their policyholders 4. In addition, in some 
Member States’ unfair business practices in the insurance sector 
were revealed, such as the provision of improper advice on 
products or insufficient disclosure of information to insurance 
purchasers. These selling practices 
aimed at incentivising purchasers to 
buy products bringing high returns to 
insurance intermediaries. As a result, 
consumers were often sold products 
unsuitable for them and entailing high 
investment risk5.
These developments urged the 
Commission to investigate the insurance markets across 
the EU. In its 2007 report on sectoral inquiry into business 
insurance, the Commission highlighted proper remuneration 
disclosure as an effective means to mitigate conflicts of 
interest between commercial considerations of insurance 
intermediaries and the objectivity of advice they provide to 
their clients6. Since the publication of this report, the necessity 
for adequate conflict of interest and conduct of business rules 
for insurance mediation business came under the spotlight. 
However, the regime introduced under IMD1 lacked clear and 
efficient conduct of business and conflict of interest rules, 
and thus could not ensure transparent selling processes and 
prevent mis-selling of products. Hence, the Commission had 
to assess different options to improve the functioning of 
insurance markets. In 2010, it announced the revision of IMD1 
modelled on the conflict of interest and conduct of business 
rules of MiFID 7.
When adopted in 2004, MiFID revolutionised the world of 
financial investment markets by establishing new mechanisms 
for the prevention and mitigation of conflicts of interest when 
selling and advising on investment products. Implementing 
measures detailed in MiFID require investment firms to 
implement specific processes and controls for the identification, 
management and disclosure of any risks harming the interests 
of their customers. Furthermore, MiFID 
bans commissions paid by third parties to 
act as independent advisors. As for other 
advisors, it allows payments only if they 
are properly disclosed to the customers 
and enhance the quality of the service 
provided. Finally, MiFID introduced 
detailed rules to guarantee fair conduct 
of business by investment firms, such as 
rules on conducting specific suitability 
and appropriateness tests for the assessment of suitability of 
recommended products for their purchasers. When providing 
investment advice or portfolio management to customers, 
investment firms should obtain appropriate information 
about the customer regarding his knowledge and experience 
of the specific type of product or service, financial situation 
and investment objectives. Only after the information provided 
by a customer has been processed, may the investment firm 
recommend an investment product that is suitable for the 
individual customer. 
Undoubtedly, detailed MiFID rules provide for a high level 
of consumer protection and can serve as a good benchmark 
for the future changes to IMD1. However, these rules were 
designed for investment products and cannot be copied 
for the insurance sector without necessary adjustments. 
The following chapter will explained to what extent the 
Commission was inspired by MiFID rules. 
IMD2 and new approach to consumer protection standards 
in the insurance mediation sector
In the explanatory memorandum attached to the proposal for 
IMD2, the Commission refers to the current financial crisis and 
the necessity of shifting the focus to strengthening consumer 
protection and ensuring a level playing field between different 
insurance distribution channels. The Commission is trying to 
achieve these objectives by extending the scope of IMD2, 
tightening provisions on professional requirements and pre-
contractual information, and including more stringent rules 
on conflicts of interest for the investment insurance products. 
Scope of the IMD2
In the future, consumers buying insurance products directly 
from insurance companies will benefit from the expanded 
scope of IMD2, as it will also apply to employees of insurance 
companies responsible for direct selling (Article 1 (1)). 
Changes brought about by the IMD2 will be of added value 
for consumers living in those countries where this channel 
is often used for purchasing insurance policies8. Until now 
this distribution channel remained unregulated at EU level. 
Although conflict of interest rules relating to remuneration 
disclosure might be of low relevance here, consumers will 
definitely benefit from enhanced professional and information 
requirements for insurers’ employees. 
Secondly, IMD2 will cover various groups of professionals either 
selling insurance on an ancillary basis (e.g. travel agencies or 
car rental shops) or providing after-sales services (e.g. loss 
adjusters and experts appraising claims). The information 
requirements imposed by IMD2 on these distribution channels 
will help consumers, for example with understanding the 
coverage of insurance policies offered in addition to certain 
products or services (e.g. when renting cars or buying holiday 
packages). 
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By broadening the scope of the new rules, IMD2 will first of all 
provide the same level of information given to purchasers of 
insurance products irrespective of the channel. Additionally, 
a level playing field between ‘traditional’ intermediaries 
and other distribution channels will be guaranteed. Such 
a modification will also contribute to coherent application 
of insurance mediation rules in different Member States9.  
However, IMD2 requirements may be adapted according to 
the complexity of products sold, for example with regard to 
professional requirements for sellers of ancillary insurance 
products of low risk (Article 4 and 8 (1)). This will help to avoid 
disproportionate burdens for businesses.
Professional requirements
The proposal in its current form does not foresee any significant 
changes to the professional requirements in comparison to 
the old directive. All persons involved in insurance distribution 
shall possess an appropriate level of knowledge and ability, 
and demonstrate appropriate professional experience to 
perform their duties adequately (Article 8). However, the 
Commission has decided to make use of its new competences 
and empowered itself to supplement IMD2 by delegated 
acts. These future non-legislative acts 
will specify the notion of ‘adequate 
knowledge and ability’ and the criteria 
for determining the appropriate level of 
qualifications, experience and skills of 
carrying insurance mediation (Article 8 
(8)). Hence, the IMD2 will become a 
framework directive reinforced by Level 2 
measures providing for more detailed 
rules. This will allow for a more coherent 
interpretation by the Member States 
of certain notions which were unclear 
under IMD1, as well as legal certainty for 
both consumers and distributors.
Conduct of business rules and remuneration disclosure 
The most significant change to be introduced by the IMD2, 
which will be of high relevance for the future purchasers of 
insurance products, concerns the disclosure of remuneration 
received by persons pursuing insurance mediation activities 
from third parties (Article 17 (1 f)). Modelled on examples 
from MiFID, the proposal for 
IMD2 requires all insurance 
distributors to inform their 
consumers about the dif-
ferent elements of the total 
price of insurance policies, 
including the nature (e.g. 
commissions or fees), 
structure and amount of 
their remuneration. The 
advantages of this new 
disclosure regime for con-
sumers are two-fold: firstly, 
it will contribute to greater 
transparency when selling 
insurance products and allow 
consumers to better assess total costs of these products (e.g. 
parts of premiums paid to cover intermediaries’ fees) and 
thus make better informed decisions. Secondly, adequate 
information on all costs and additional charges associated 
with insurance products will allow consumers to compare 
different channels and choose the cheapest one. 
Moreover, the IMD2 will address the problem of contingent 
commissions paid on the basis of achieving a pre-determined 
target. It will require intermediaries to tell their customers 
about such targets and amounts of commission paid upon 
achievement of such targets (Article 17 (1g)). Although 
contingent commissions will not be prohibited directly, 
the obligatory information on their existence will sensitise 
consumers to the risk of potential conflict of interest. 
By requiring intermediaries to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of their 
customers, IMD2 will introduce only high-level rules on 
conduct of business and will therefore not raise consumer 
protection standards to the level guaranteed by MiFID   
(Article 15). 
Strengthened consumer protection requirements 
for insurance investment products 
The Commission decided, in line with its earlier announcements, 
to propose a set of distinct rules for insurance investment 
products. These products are sold in many countries as 
unit-linked life insurance policies or other investments 
packaged as life insurance policies.   
In contrast to classic insurance 
products, investment insurance 
products entail investment risk for 
their purchasers and are therefore 
classified as high-risk products. 
Nevertheless, in many countries they 
are either not regulated or fall under 
general insurance regulations; as a 
consequence, insurance intermediaries 
are not being required to disclose 
to their customers the costs and 
risk associated with these products. 
Most mis-selling cases concern this 
type of products as consumers are often unaware of any risks 
involved and potential financial losses they may incur when 
buying these products. With a separate set of rules included in 
IMD2, the Commission wants to address this problem and at 
the same time fit into a broader discussion on the ‘Consumer 
retail Package’ and the regulation of so-called packaged retail 
investment products at EU level10. 
The MiFID conduct of 
business and conflict of 
interest rules has now 
become a clear benchmark 
for insurance selling prac-
tices; but it remains to be 
seen whether these rules 
will prove applicable for 
insurance.
Insurance investment pro-
ducts will undergo a more 
stringent and MiFID-inspired 
regime on the identification, 
mitigation and disclosure of 
conflicts of interest to provide consumers with even greater 
protection than when selling classic insurance products. 
Consumers buying insurance investment products will 
need to obtain information about the product’s insurance 
coverage and all costs and investment risks related to it. 
Enhanced requirements also concern the provision of 
appropriate advice to customers with a proper assessment 
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of suitability and appropriateness of products during the 
selling process. Finally, IMD2 will introduce a revolutionary 
change concerning a ban on commissions and fees for 
independent insurance brokers selling these types of 
products. All these requirements are a copy-paste of MiFID   
rules; only their application in practice will help determine 
whether or not they are workable for the insurance sector.
Does IMD2 continue minimum harmonisation approach?
As mentioned before, IMD1 is a minimum harmonisation 
directive and its implementation resulted in many gaps and 
inconsistencies. Nonetheless, the Commission decided to 
maintain the same features for the IMD2. Such a solution 
might be an attempt by the Commission to accommodate 
different legislative developments in the Member States in 
the aftermath of the IMD1. For instance, when transposing 
IMD1 some countries (e.g. Finland and Denmark) introduced 
so called net-quoting system, namely that intermediaries were 
prohibited from receiving commissions from insurance firms. 
Maintaining a minimum harmonisation approach should 
allow these Member States to maintain stricter national rules. 
At the same time, countries where the remuneration has not 
yet been regulated (e.g. Poland), will be required to lift their 
regulatory standards to the level of IMD2.
However, parts of IMD2 relating to insurance investment 
products follow the MiFID approach, with high-level rules 
supplemented by detailed Level 2 delegated acts. Since MiFID 
is considered to be a maximum harmonisation Directive, this 
level of harmonisation might be unavoidable for insurance 
investment products. For the time being, it is not clear how 
much flexibility will be left to the Member States in this respect. 
Since the Commission strives to significantly raise minimum 
standards, the final outcome might be a high degree of 
harmonisation with consistent rules and the same consumer 
protection level across the EU.
Conclusions
The flaws in the IMD1 regime can be summarised in four points: 
•	 Regulatory	 patchwork	 due	 to	 minimum	 harmonisation	  
 character;
•	 Insufficient	 information	 requirements	 to	 guarantee	  
  transparency for consumers;
•	 Lack	of	clear	and	efficient	conduct	of	business	and	conflict	  
  of interest rules to prevent mis-selling of products;
•	 No	level	playing	field	between	intermediaries	and	other	  
  distributors of insurance products.  
The new IMD2 will address these issues by firstly expanding 
the scope of its application and thus creating a level playing 
field between different distribution channels. Consumers 
will definitely benefit from the same level of protection 
irrespective of the distribution channel through which they 
will buy insurance products. 
Secondly, IMD2 will be a starting point for identifying, 
managing and mitigating conflicts of interest for classic 
insurance products and it will introduce a more enhanced 
regime for investment insurance products. The increased 
transparency on selling practices will help to avoid conflicts 
of interests and to regain consumer confidence and trust in 
insurance markets. 
Furthermore, by reinforcing advice standards in relation to 
insurance investment products, IMD2 will introduce more 
transparency and help consumers to better understand the 
characteristics of different offers and whether products will be 
suitable for them. 
Three points are worth mentioning when it comes to certain 
risks associated with the proposal for a new directive. In the 
financial services world new costs are often passed on to end-
users, in our case insurance policyholders. New requirements 
for insurance business will involve costs which might, at the 
end, result in higher premiums for policyholders. Secondly,   
the mandatory disclosure of remuneration is a revolutionary 
step forward and will be a clear novelty for the insurance 
industry. However, it may incentivise intermediaries and 
insurance companies to look into new forms of cooperation 
and new commercial structures to circumvent this 
requirement. Finally, the new regime will distinguish between 
classic and investment insurance products, resulting in 
insurance distributors following different rules in the future.   
To provide for more simplification, the Commission might 
decide to align these rules when taking up a new revision 
exercise in the future. This might cause certain problems 
as MiFID rules might not always address the specificity of 
insurance business. 
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